The aim of the aggregation theory is to link the micro and macroeconomic notions of aggregate demand. One would like such a link to exist for any heterogeneous population, for a large set of all conceivable income assignments, and for a small number of statistics of the income distribution. This cannot be achieved. What can be achieved is critically discussed in Section 2. In Section 3, another important topic of aggregation theory is considered: how does mean demand react to price changes? As an example, the 'law of demand' is discussed.
Introduction
Aggregation theory of demand aims at identifying observable explanatory variables for aggregate demand starting from a microeconomic description of the underlying population of households. In the simple case, where the demand decision of a household is the choice of a commodity vector in a budget set, which is determined by the price vector p and income x (total expenditure), the demand behaviour of a household h is modeled by a demand function f h (p, x) ∈ R l + (commodity space), which is defined for every strictly positive price vector p ∈ P and every income level x ≥ 0. The demand function f h might, but need not be derived from preference maximization under the budget constraint.
Aggregate demand is defined as mean demand across the population H, that is to say,
The population H is viewed as hetero-geneous in income and demand behaviour. Thus, mean demand is determined by the price vector p and the joint distribution of income x h and demand function f h across the population H.
This general microeconomic definition of mean demand is sufficiently specific for certain problems in pure theory, e.g., for the existence problem in general equilibrium theory.
In macroeconomics or in applied demand analysis the notion of aggregate demand is quite different. There the explanatory variables for aggregate demand are the price vector and certain statistics S(G x ) of the income distribution function G x such as mean income, a measure of income inequality (e.g., the variance of log income) or higher moments of the income distribution. In any case, no household specific variable is used in the aggregate demand function. The aim of the aggregation theory is to link the micro and macroeconomic notions of aggregate demand. More specifically, given an assignment (f h ) h∈H of demand functions and a set X ⊂ R H + of income assignments (x h ) h∈H , one seeks for a representation of mean demand of the following form: there exists a function F from P × R N into R l + and N statistics S 1 (G x ), . . . , S N (G x ) of the income distribution function G x , such that
for all income assignments (x h ) h∈H in X and all price vectors p in P .
One would like such a representation to exist for any heterogeneous population H, for a large set X , ideally for all conceivable income assignments, i.e., X = R H + and for a small number N of statistics. This, of course, cannot be achieved.
The theory of income aggregation is surveyed in section I, where also basic references are given. The main results are:
• a representation of the form (1), which must hold in the case X = R H + is an unreasonable strong requirement. Indeed, if a representation exists, then the population H must be homogeneous in demand behaviour, i.e., f h = f for all h ∈ H, and furthermore
• if N is less than the number of households in H and the common demand function f has the basic properties of demand theory (budget identity and homogeneity), then either f is linear in income or at least for one commodity i, the income share function w i (p, x) := p i f i (p, x)/x is oscillating (i.e., the derivative ∂ x w i (p, ·) changes its sign infinitely often).
Thus, households' behaviour which is modeled by the common demand function is either unreasonably simple or incredibly sophisticated. These results clearly show that the requirement X = R H + leads to an ill-posed problem.
For a heterogeneous population H there exists (see example 3) a finite partition {X k } k∈K of the set R H + of all conceivable income assignments and for every k ∈ K there is a function F k (p, G), where G denotes an income distribution function, such that
for every income assignment (x h ) h∈H in the set X k and for every p ∈ P .
Thus, for a heterogeneous population H, there is no closed-form definition of an aggregate demand function; there is only a piecewise one, since the aggregate demand functions F k and F j are different for k = j. The less heterogeneous the population the coarser the partition, i.e., the smaller is #K. The sets X k of the partition are large (see Example 3), in particular, if (x h 0 ) ∈ X k , then for every strictly increasing function ϕ the income assignment x h = ϕ(x h 0 ), h ∈ H, also belongs to X k (see Figures 3  and 4) .
The aggregate demand functions F k (p, G) in (2) require the knowledge of the entire income distribution. In many applications one might assume that the distribution of relevant income assignments in the set X k can be modeled by some few parameters (structural stability of income distributions). For example, if the population is 'very large' one might restrict attention to those (x h ) in X k whose distributions are (approximately) log normal. Then, on this subset of X k , mean demand has a representation of the form F k (p,x, σ), wherex denotes mean income across the population and σ 2 is the variance of log income, which can be interpreted as a measure of income inequality.
Another important topic of aggregation theory is to analyse how mean demand of a heterogeneous population reacts to price changes under the ceteris paribus clause that households' income and demand functions remain fixed. In this case mean demand is denoted by F (p). Among the various desirable dependence structures is certainly the 'law' of demand, which asserts that the vector ∆p ∈ R l of price changes and the resulting vector ∆F ∈ R l of mean demand changes point in opposite directions, i.e., the scalar product ∆p · ∆F :
Certainly, the 'law' is not meant to be an empirical law, but a monotonicity property of the mean demand function F (p) which is defined under a ceteris paribus clause in a mathematical model of a population of households. Thus, the 'law' asserts that the mean demand function F is strictly monotone, i.e.,
In particular, every partial mean demand curve is strictly decreasing. This partial monotonicity property, however, is not sufficient for proving the uniqueness and stability of the equilibria for a multi-commodity demandsupply system; one needs strict monotonicity in the multi-commodity version.
Which behavioural assumption on the household level and/or which form of heterogeneity of the population lead to monotone mean demand? To answer this question one assumes that demand functions f h satisfy the weak axiom of revealed preferences or, more specifically, that they are derived from preference maximization. Then, partial monotonicity is easily obtained, for example, by excluding inferior goods. However, multicommodity monotonicity is more difficult to obtain. Trivially, mean demand is monotone if all demand functions f h (p, x h ) were monotone in p. This, however, requires that either f h (p, ·) is linear in income or that the Slutzky substitution effect is sufficiently strong. (For a precise formulation, see the Theorem of Mitjuschin and Polterovich, 1978; LAW OF DE-MAND.) Since the Slutzky substitution effect might be arbitrarily small, one is interested in finding alternative assumptions, which do not rely on a strong Slutzky substitution effect. These assumptions should not require that households' demand functions are monotone. Obviously, to obtain the desirable aggregation effect, the population must be heterogeneous. Thus, in contrast to the problem of income aggregation, heterogeneity does not complicate the analysis, yet it is necessary to obtain monotonicity of mean demand by aggregation. More details are given in section II. For example, let H be a population which is homogeneous in demand behaviour, i.e., f h = f , h ∈ H and the common demand function is not monotone. However, the population is heterogeneous in income. Then, for a given income assignment (x h ) h∈H , mean demand F H (p) is not monotone in p. If one increases now the population size, i.e., the number #H of households tends to infinity and if for increasing #H the income distribution functions G H of households in H converge to a concave distribution function G, then, for #H sufficiently large, mean demand F H (p) is 'approximately' monotone, that is to say, F H (p) converges to a monotone function. Consequently, in the limit, i.e., for an indefinitely large population which admits a concave income distribution function, mean demand is monotone. The mathematical model for such a limit population cannot be a finite or countably infinite set; it must be an atomless measure space of households, e.g., the unit interval [0, 1] with Lebesgue measure (continuum of households).
If these large populations are heterogeneous in income and demand behaviour, then one can meaningfully pose the problem of 'smoothing by aggregation': is mean demand continuous or differentiable without assuming these properties on the household level? The basic reference is Trockel (1984) .
Finally, one should mention the literature on 'behavioural heterogeneity' initiated by Grandmont (1992) . Here the goal is to obtain a stronger property than strict monotonicity of mean demand: diagonal dominance of the Jacobian ∂ p F (p) of mean demand in the sense that
This diagonal dominance models a strong restriction on the interdependence among the various commodity markets and is the basis for partial equilibrium analysis. For a general discussion of 'behavioural heterogeneity' see Hildenbrand and Kneip (2005) .
Income Aggregation
The demand behaviour of every household h in a population H is modeled by a demand function f h ∈ F. In this section it is not required that demand functions are derived by preference maximization under budget constraints. One only needs that demand functions f ∈ F are continuous functions from P × R + into R l + with f (p, 0) = 0, where P denotes the set of all strictly positive price vectors in R l .
For every income assignment
The 'problem of income aggregation' has been defined in the literature by the question: does there exist a function
for all income assignments in a given set X ⊂ R H + and all p ∈ P ?
If one asks this question for all conceivable income assignments, i.e., X = R H + , then this is an ill-posed problem since it allows only a trivial solution.
Theorem (Antonelli, 1886) : There exists a function F (p,x) such that (1) holds on R H + × P if and only if the population H is homogeneous in demand behaviour, i.e., f h = f , and furthermore
One might ask whether a less restrictive condition than (3) allows for a nontrivial solution. That is to say, one might consider mean demand func-tions that depend on a wider set of aggregate income variables than just mean income, for example, the variance or higher moments of the distribution of income. The answer is definitely negative.
for all conceivable income assignments, i.e., X = R H + and all p ∈ P , if and only if the population H is homogeneous in demand behaviour, i.e., all households in H have the same demand function. Then
Proof: Consider any two households k and j in H, and an income assignment (x h ) h∈H with x k > 0 and x j = 0. Now one interchanges the income of households k and j. This does not change the distribution function of income. Hence property (4) and the fact that
The justification for considering the generalized problem of income aggregation as defined by (4) is based on the view that for large populations, which this survey emphasizes, income distribution functions can often be modeled by some few parameters, e.g. log-normal distributions.
By Proposition 1 it is clear that one is forced to restrict the set X of admissible income assignments if one wants to escape the case of trivial solutions, f h = f , to the aggregation problem as defined by (4). Motivated by the special role which zero income and the assumption f (p, 0) = 0 play in the proofs of Antonelli's Theorem or Proposition 1 one has considered in the literature (e.g. Nataf, 1948 or Gorman, 1953 a restriction on the domain of individual income:
Proposition 2 shows that this restriction allows merely for some very limited and quite special heterogeneity in demand behaviour of the population H.
Proposition 2.
(i) There exists a function F (p, G) such that (2) holds on X (a, b) × P if and only if for every commodity i and p ∈ P the income expansion paths f h i (p, ·), h ∈ H, are parallel (vertically) on the interval (a,b); (with differentiability) ∂ x f h i (p, x) does not depend on h ∈ H (Figure 1 ).
(ii) There exists a function F (p,x) such that (1) holds on X (a, b) × P if and only if for every commodity i and p ∈ P the income expansion paths f (i) Consider any two households k and j in H and an income assignment in X (a, b) with x k = x j . Now one interchanges the income of households k and j. This does not change the income distribution function.
Since it holds for all x k , x j ∈ (a, b) and all p ∈ P one obtains the claimed property in (i). The converse is trivial.
(ii) Instead of interchanging the income of households k and j one chooses x k +∆ and x j −∆ ∈ (a, b) for sufficiently small ∆. Property (1) then implies
by (i), which implies the claimed property in (ii). The converse is trivial.
(iii) If the expansion paths f k i (p, ·), h ∈ H, are parallel on (a, b) for every p ∈ P , then homogeneity implies that they are also parallel on (λa, λb) for all λ > 0 and p ∈ P . Hence they are parallel on (0, ∞) for all p ∈ P . Continuity and f h (p, 0) = 0 then implies the claim.
An alternative approach to allow for heterogeneous populations consists of considering, in addition to income, further explanatory variables for household demand. For example, in applications it is standard practice to stratify the whole population H by a certain profile a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . ) of observable household attributes, such as household size, age of household head, etc. Let H(a) denote the subpopulation of all households in H with attribute profile a. Without loss of generality one can assume that a ∈ R m . Let G x,a denote the joint distribution of function of x h , a h across H. Analogously to Proposition 1 one shows
for all conceivable income-attribute assignments and all p ∈ P if and only if all subpopulations H(a) are homogeneous in demand behaviour, i.e., f h = f a for all h ∈ H(a).
Thus, the whole population need not be homogeneous, yet the joint distribution of x h and a h across H has typically a complex dependence structure, and hence, it cannot be modeled by some few parameters, as in the case of income.
Exact income aggregation
In the literature on 'exact income aggregation', as initiated by Gorman (1953) , Lau (1982), and Jorgenson et al. (1982) , one seeks for a representation of mean demand which is less restrictive than (3), yet more demanding than (4), that is to say,
on R H + × P for some continuous function F from P × R N into R l (the commodity space) and some vector of distributional statistics S 1 (G x ), . . . , S N (G x ) with N < #H. This representation is more demanding than (4); it does not require the knowledge of the entire income distribution since N < #H.
If such a representation exists, then by Proposition 1, f h = f , h ∈ H, and f is called 'exactly aggregable.' Thus, the question is whether there are exactly aggregable demand functions which are not linear in income and satisfy the basic restrictions of demand theory?
To simplify the presentation one assumes that all distributional statistics are 'generalized moments', i.e., S n (G x ) = s n (ξ)dG x (ξ), with continuous functions s n (·). Without loss of generality one can require that s n (0) = 0.
Proposition 3. There exists a representation of mean demand of the form
which holds for every income distribution function G x of every finite population H and every price vector in P if and only if the function f is of the form
where α n (p) ∈ R l .
Proof: Trivially, (6) implies (5). Assume that (5) holds. Let G denote the set of all income distribution functions for every finite population. Note that for every G 1 , G 2 ∈ G and any rational λ with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 it follows that
The representation (5) implies for every commodity i
Now one shows that the function F i (p, ·) has a 'linear structure' on its rel-
for every y 1 , y 2 ∈ D and any rational λ with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Indeed, y
Consequently, the closureD of D is convex. Since G λ ∈ G, one obtains from (5)
The left hand side is equal to λ f i (p, ξ)dG (5), which proves (8). Since F i is continuous, the 'linear structure' (8) also holds for any y 1 , y 2 in the closureD of D and any λ with 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1. Since s n (0) = 0 and f (p, 0) = 0 it follows from (7) that F i (p, 0) = 0. Consequently, by (8), the restriction of the function F i (p, ·) on the convex domainD can be extended to a functionF i (p, ·), which is linear in y, i.e., (7) implies (6). The extension is unique if the dimension of the convex domainD is equal to N .
Remark:
The proof of Proposition 3 is quite simple since it was assumed that the representation (5) must hold for all income distribution functions for all finite populations. This case is also treated in Heineke and Shefrin (1988) , their proof, however, requires differentiability. If one only requires (5) to hold for all income distribution functions of a given population H with N < #H, then it is much more difficult to obtain (6). See Lau (1982) and Heineke and Shefrin (1988) .
Note that the global structural specification (6) is very restrictive if the demand function f ∈ F has the basic properties of static demand theory. In fact, Heineke and Shefrin (1987) show the following result: if f ∈ F satisfies the budget-identity, is homogeneous in p and x and if no budget share function w i (p, x) := p i f i (p, x)/x is oscillating (i.e., the derivative ∂ x w i (p, x) changes infinitely often its sign), then (6) 
Indeed, if f ∈ F satisfies the budget identity, then 0 ≤ w i (p, x) ≤ 1. Let the budget share function w k (p, ·) be non-constant and non-oscillating. Consider the function φ λ (·), λ > 0, defined by φ λ (x) = w k (p, λx), and the linear function space which is generated by all functions φ λ (·), λ > 0. Heineke and Shefrin (1987) argue that the dimension of this linear space is infinite. By homogeneity, φ λ (x) = w k (p/λ, x); thus, the linear space L which is generated by all budget share functions w k (p, ·), p ∈ P has infinite dimension. Consequently, the demand function f cannot satisfy (6), since (6) implies that dim L ≤ N . Thus, if f satisfies (6) and w k (p, ·) is nonoscillating, then it must be constant, i.e., f k (p, ·) is linear.
As a consequence, for demand functions which have the basic properties of atemporal demand theory including non-oscillating budget share functions, one either has to be satisfied with a representation as in Proposition 1 or one is in the trivial case of Antonelli's Theorem.
Heterogeneous populations
The representations (3), (4), and (5) of mean demand which have been considered up to now imply that the population of households must be homogeneous in demand behaviour, i.e., f h ≡ f, h ∈ H. The reason for this unsatisfactory fact is due to the very strong requirement that the representations must hold for every conceivable income assignment. This is more demanding than is needed in many applications, since there, changes in individual income are not entirely arbitrary; they might be the result of an underlying process. This point was emphasized by Malinvaud (1956) and (1993) . To capture this idea, one starts from an initial income assignment (x h 0 ) (status quo), and then one considers a sequence (x h n ), n = 1, 2, . . . or a set X (x 0 ) of income assignments which are viewed as the result of the underlying (unspecified) process. Which properties must the sequence (x h n ) or the set X (x 0 ) have such that for any assignment of demand functions f h the representations of mean demand hold along this sequence or on the set X (x 0 )?
We give three examples. The first one is well-known. The second and third example generalize substantially the first one.
Example 1: Fixed income shares
Starting from an initial income assignment (x h 0 ), one defines the set X (δ) ⊂ R H + of income assignments
wherex denotes mean income across H.
Given any assignment of demand functions f h , h ∈ H, there exists a function F from P × R + into R l + such that mean demand has the representation
The function F is defined by Eisenberg (1961) and Chipman and Moore (1979) have shown: if all f h are generated by a utility function homogeneous of degree one then F (p,x) is also generated by a utility function homogeneous of degree one given by
Example 2: Rank preserving income changes.
Starting from an initial income assignment (x h 0 ) h∈H one defines the set X (x 0 ) ⊂ R H + of income assignments (x h ) which have the property that every household keeps his rank position of income, i.e., if for two households j and k, x 
Thus, there is a finite partition {X i } of R H + into setsX i of rank preserving income assignments.
Note that for any rank preserving income assignments (x h ) in X (x 0 ) one can recover the income assignment from knowing only its distribution function G x , since x h = G −1
x G 0 (x h 0 ) for every h ∈ H, where G −1 denotes the quantile function (quasi-inverse) of the distribution function G, which is defined by G −1 (q) := inf{x ∈ R + | G(x) ≥ q}. Consequently, one obtains:
Given any assignment of demand functions f h , h ∈ H, there exists a function F (p, G) such that mean demand has the representation
The function F is defined by
There might be larger sets than X (x 0 ) for which the representation (10) holds. For example, if households k and j have the same demand function then one can interchange their rank position. Thus, in defining a set X for which (10) holds, one should take into account the heterogeneity structure of (f h ) h∈H . This is done in the next example
Example 3: Common copula
Let {f 1 , . . . , f N } be the set of distinct demand functions of the given assignment (f h ) h∈H . Thus, for h ∈ H there is an integer n(h) ≤ N such that f h = f n(h) . For every income assignment (x h ) h∈H consider the bivariate distribution function D x , which is defined by
The distribution function D x and the price vector p determines mean demand
The marginal distribution functions of D x are denoted by G x and V . By Sklar's Theorem (see, e.g., Nelson, 1999) , for every bivariate distribution function D with marginals G and V , there exists a copula C (a function from [0, 1] 2 into [0, 1] with certain properties) such that D(ξ, η) = C(G(ξ), V (η)) for all ξ, η ∈ R. Conversely, if C is a copula and G and V are distribution functions, then C(G(ξ), V (η)) is a bivariate distribution function. Thus, a copula 'couples' the marginals to the bivariate distribution. The copula models the dependence structure of the bivariate distribution function.
Starting from an initial income assignment (x h 0 ), one considers the set X (x 0 , f ) ⊂ R H + of income assignments (x h ) such that the corresponding bivariate distribution functions D x have a common copula. Thus, the dependence structure of (x h , f h ) across H is the same for all (x h ) in X (x 0 , f ). It follows that income assignments in the set X (x 0 ) of rank preserving income assignments is contained in the set X (x 0 , f ). Furthermore, given any assignment of demand functions (f h ) h∈H , there exists a function F (p, G) such that mean demand has the representation
There is a very simple, however, special case which is worthwhile to be mentioned (and could have been discussed at the beginning). If the initial income x h 0 and the demand function f h of household h are independently distributed across H, i.e.,
is very large; it consists of all income assignments (x h ) ∈ R H + with the property:
Monotone mean demand
The 'law' of demand for a population of households asserts that the vector of price changes ∆p ∈ R l and the resulting vector of mean demand changes ∆F ∈ R l point in opposite directions, provided the price changes do not affect households' incomes (total expenditure) and demand functions (preferences). Thus, the 'law' asserts that the mean demand function F (p) is strictly monotone, i.e.
Strict monotonicity of mean demand implies, in particular, that for every commodity i the partial mean demand function F i is strictly decreasing in its own price p i and that the mean demand function F (·) is invertible (existence of an inverse demand function).
The goal of aggregation theory is to derive strict monotonicity of mean demand without assuming that households' demand functions f h (p, x) are strictly monotone in p.
Demand functions f h ∈ F are assumed to be continuous in p and x and satisfy the budget-identity p · f (p, x) = x. The function f ∈ F satisfies the Weak Axiom of revealed preferences if for every price-income pair (p, x) and
Every demand function which is derived from a continuous, strictly convex and non-saturated preference relation satisfies the Axiom, yet it is not necessarily monotone.
Theorem (Hildenbrand, 1983) 1. The function F (p) :
the Weak Axiom of revealed preferences and ρ is a density which is non-increasing on R + with ∞ 0 ρ(x)dx < ∞ 2. The function F is strictly monotone, if, in addition, f satisfies the Axiom of revealed preferences and the expansion paths f (p, .) and f (q, .) have only 0 in common for any p, q that are not collinear.
Interpretation:
The underlying micro-model is a population H of households which is 'indefinitely large'; mathematically, an atomless measure space, e.g. the unit interval [0, 1] with Lebesgue measure. Every household h ∈ [0, 1] is modeled by its income x(h) ≥ 0 and the common demand function f. The income assignment x(·) is an integrable function whose distribution admits a density ρ. Thus, mean demand
Three questions are relevant:
1. Why a continuum of households? Does the result still hold approximately for a large but finite population? (Hildenbrand, 1994, Appendix 6) .
Let the densities ρ m be as in Figure 5 .
< Figure 5 here > For every n there exists m(n) > 0 such that
For a more general analysis see Chiappori (1985) and Hildenbrand (1994) .
Question 3: A population of households that is heterogeneous in income and demand functions is described by a joint distribution µ of income and demand functions, i.e., µ is a distribution on R + ×F. (A reader not familiar with distributions on function spaces might replace F by a finite set F 0 ). As before, the marginal distribution of income admits a density ρ. The conditional distribution of demand functions given the income level x is denoted by ν(x). Then mean demand
wheref (p, x) := F f (p, x)dν(x). Consequently, the Theorem or the extensions discussed under Question 2 imply that F (p) is monotone provided the functionf satisfies the Weak Axiom. This approach to derive monotonicity for a heterogeneous population is the most direct, yet not the most general way (see Hildenbrand, 1994) .
It is well-known (Hicks, 1956, p.53 ) thatf does not necessarily satisfy the Weak Axiom, even if individual demand functions are derived from utility maximization. The following two assumptions (which, again, are not the most general ones) imply thatf satisfies the Weak Axiom (a) independence: ν(x) does not depend on x (b) increasing dispersion: the distribution D(x + ∆), ∆ > 0, is more dispersed than the distribution D(x), where D(ξ) denotes the distribution (in the commodity space R l ) of individual demand of all households with income ξ at the price p (i.e., D(ξ) is the image distribution of ν under the mapping f → f (p, ξ)).
Generalizing the one-dimensional case where the variance is a measure of dispersion one chooses the positive definiteness of the covariance matrix as a measure of dispersion for distributions on R l . Thus, increasing dispersion means that for ∆ > 0, covD(x + ∆) − covD(x) is positive semidefinite.
Assumptions (a) and (b) are quite restrictive, in particular, the independence assumption. Therefore one partitions the whole population H into subpopulations H(a) by stratifying with respect to a certain vector a of household attributes (household size, age, ...) and then one requires assumptions (a) and (b) for each subpopulation H(a). The role of stratifying is to reduce the heterogeneity in demand behaviour. In the extreme case, where stratifying leads to a homogeneous subpopulation in demand behaviour, assumptions (a) and (b) are trivially satisfied. If the income density of each subpopulation H(a) is non-increasing on R + or if the extension discussed in Question 2 apply, the mean demand of each subpopulation is monotone and hence also the mean demand of the whole population, since monotonicity is additive.
A more general definition of 'increasing dispersion' and a detailed discussion is given in Hildenbrand (1994) . For an empirical study of the "Law of Demand' see Härdle et al. (1991) .
A broader discussion of the law of demand and related properties including cases where income is price dependent is contained in the entry 
